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Abstract
The authors deal with a certain type of timing problem with the central government's
allocation of subsidies to local governments, called a ``soft budget constraint (SBC)
problem.'' In fiscal science, it has been indicated that the interregional redistribution policy of
the central government causes incentive problems such as excess expenditure or excess debt.
However, as insignificant amount of the literature has applied a multi-period model to
explain the SBC problem occuring despite the possibility of the existence of intertemporal
distortion in an SBC situation. Therefore, the authors examine the problem in two-period
models, which are the easiest multi-period models. The authors will demonstrate that the path
of occurrence of the distortion caused by subsidization varies according to the timing of the
subsidy offer.
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In this paper, we deal with a certain type of timing problem with the central gov-
ernment’s allocation of subsidies to local governments; this problem is referred to as the
“soft budget constraint (SBC) problem.” In ﬁscal science, it has been indicated that the
interregional redistribution policy of the central government causes incentive problems
such as excess expenditure or excess debt. However, an insigniﬁcant amount of literature
has applied a multiperiod model to explain the occurrence of the SBC problem despite
the possibility of the existence of intertemporal distortion in an SBC situation. We ex-
amine the problem in two-period models, which are the easiest multiperiod models. We
will demonstrate that the path of occurrence of the distortion caused by subsidization
varies according to the timing of the subsidy oﬀer.
The origin of SBC is related to the analyses of distortions resulting from bailouts of
loss-making state-owned enterprises in a socialized economy (see Kornai (1979, 1980)).
Thereafter, SBC has been applied to the problem of subsidies provided to local govern-
ments by the central government. For example, Wildasin (1997) attempts an analysis of a
situation wherein the central government provides ex-post subsidy relief to areas in which
the consumption of public and private goods is in short supply as compared with that
in other areas. It concludes that under such conditions, the budget constraints of local
governments “soften” and the supply of public goods and the rate of tax are distorted.
In this paper, we suppose that there are two situations wherein local governments’
decisions on the supply of local public goods and on the issue of local bonds and the central
government’s decisions on the delivery of subsidies are made at diﬀerent timings. In one
situation, the central government decides the subsidy as the ﬁrst move of every period,
and the local governments subsequently supply the local public goods; this is referred
to as the “central leadership” (CL) model. In the other situation, the order of moves is
inverted; this is known as the “decentralized leadership” (DL) model. Toy examples of
these are described in Figure 1. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the CL model,
the central government plays “do not subsidize” and the local government plays “manage
soundly.” By contrast, the local government plays “manage loosely” and the central
government plays “subsidize” in the equilibrium of the DL model. Therefore, the above
examples show that a distortion occurs if the central government can, before choosing
an action, observe the actions of the local government. This is the usual explanation of
the SBC problem in the context of intergovernmental transfer, hereinafter we refer to the
distortion as “basic SBC distortion.” On the other hand, no ineﬃciency is found in the
above CL model.
However, this result is not necessarily found only in a one-period model. If the re-
lations between the central and local governments are maintained over the periods, the
present decision making by local governments should have an inﬂuence on future deci-
sions pertaining to central government subsidies. It can also be said that the present
decision on the subsidy by the central government should have an inﬂuence on the future
decision making of local governments. The point is that even if there is no distortion
resulting from subsidy problems in the one-period model, distortion can be caused by
simply shifting these problems to a multiperiod model. Furthermore, as compared to a
one-period model generating distortion, there could be diﬀerent mechanisms generating
distortion in some multiperiod models. Goodspeed (2002) studies the SBC problem by
using a two-period model with local bonds. However, the model of Goodspeed (2002)
seems to be a nonstandard two-period model since two periods in the model are asym-
1metric. That is, for every government, the set of actions in the ﬁrst period is not equal to
that in the second period. Furthermore, we capture the SBC problem as a timing problem
by dealing with models with a diﬀerent order of moves, while the central government and
local governments make decisions simultaneously in the period considered in Goodspeed
(2002). Thus, the purpose of this paper is diﬀerent from that of Goodspeed (2002).
This paper is organized as follows: We devote Section 2 to the setup and solution
of the planning problem. In Sections 3 and 4, we introduce the two-period CL and DL
models. In Section 5, we attempt a discussion on the subgame perfect equilibria of the
previous sections. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Objectives and Constraints
The economy contains two regions: region 1 and region 2. Further, the economy
includes central and two local governments. A typical region or a local government is
represented by i. Each region consists of a representative resident who lives for T periods.
The resident in region i earns one unit of income in every period and his or her preference















where T indicates the last period, assumed to be 1 or 2 in this paper; ci
t indicates private
goods consumption; and gi
t indicates the local public goods1 supply in period t. They are












Both the local governments simultaneously decide the outstanding local bonds bi
t and
the local taxes qi
t. We assume that bi
0 is given. In period T, the outstanding local bonds
should be equal to ¯ bi. The central government decides the subsidies (s1
t,s2
t) to each
resident to satisfy s1
t + s2
t = 0. After the decisions of the local governments and the
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where r ∈ (0,1) is the interest rate that is invariant with time and is set for all regions.
1Strictly speaking, the goods are not public goods. We could ascribe gi
t to the properties of public
goods; however, this would add unnecessary complexity to our assertion.
22.2 Planning Problem
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The consumption that maximizes social welfare satisﬁes ci
t = gi
t for all i and t and
ci
1 = β(1 + r)ci
2 for all i. The solutions to these problems are presented in Appendix A.
We state that intratemporal consumption is eﬃcient if ci
t = gi
t and that intertemporal
consumption is eﬃcient if ci
1 = β(1 + r)ci
2 for all i.
3. DL Models
In this section, we present a one-period and a two-period DL model. The models in
this paper are divided into two classes, the DL and CL models. In the DL models, both
the local governments simultaneously move ﬁrst, followed by the central government. In
the CL models, the central government moves ﬁrst, followed by the local governments.
Akai and Sato (2005) show that there is distortion by SBC in the one-period DL model.
On the other hand, Wildasin (1997) shows that the outcome is eﬃcient in the one-period
CL model. Diﬀerences in timing between these models cause diﬀerences in eﬃciency.
The two-period version of the CL model reﬂects the same situation as the one-period DL
model. The situation in this case means that the central government decides the subsidy
after the local governments’ actions. The situation may produce diﬀerent results from
the one-period CL model. Therefore, in the next section, we will consider a two-period
CL model and show that ineﬃciencies are observed in the model.
3.1 One-Period DL Model
The players’ moves in the extensive-form game of a one-period DL model are as
follows:
(i) Both the local governments simultaneously decide the local taxes qi
1.2
(ii) The central government decides the subsidies (s1
1,s2




The private goods consumption ci




1 satisfy (1) and (2), respectively.
2By assumption, bi
1 = ¯ bi.
3The strategy of local government i is qi
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0).
The outcome is ineﬃcient. See the appendices.
3.2 Two-Period DL Model
In this section, we describe the two-period DL model. This model is similar to a
ﬁnitely repeated game except for the existence of a state variable. The “stage game” of
this model is the one-period DL model described in the above section. Every player’s
payoﬀ is the sum of the payoﬀ obtained in the two-stage game. However, at the beginning
of period 2, (b1
1,b2
1) is given as a state variable.
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The subgame perfect equilibria of the game are calculated in Appendix B. The out-
come is ineﬃcient.
4. CL Models
4.1 One-Period CL Model
The players’ moves in the extensive-form game of a one-period CL model are as
follows:
(i) The central government chooses the subsidy to local government 1, s1
1.
(ii) Both the local governments simultaneously choose their tax levels, q1
1,q2
1.
The private goods consumption ci




1 satisfy (1) and (2), respectively.
4The payoﬀ functions are the same as those of the DL model. A strategy of the central
government is s1
1, that of local government 1 is q1
1(s1




4.2 Two-Period CL Model
Although the outcome in a one-period DL model is ineﬃcient, that in a one-period
CL model is eﬃcient (see Appendices). Therefore, the timing of the governments’ actions
seems critically important. In fact, if the central government decides the subsidy after the
local governments’ actions, the local governments expect a central government bailout,
and thus, they make ineﬃcient decisions. The resource allocation in a one-period CL
model is eﬃcient since the local governments cannot expect a central government bailout
in the model. However, if we consider a multiperiod CL model, the resource allocation
may be ineﬃcient since there are intertemporal interactions between central and local
governments. Hence, in this section, we consider a two-period CL model.
This model is similar to a ﬁnitely repeated game except for the existence of state
variable. The “stage game” of this model is the one-period DL model described in the
above section. Every player’s payoﬀ is the sum of the payoﬀ obtained in a two-stage
game. However, at the beginning of period 2, (b1
1,b2
1) is given as the state variable.
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The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is calculated in Appendix C. The out-
come is ineﬃcient.
5. Discussion
5.1 Source of Distortion
One-Period Models The consumption of private goods should equal that of the local
public goods for the utility to be maximized. In the one-period CL model, this condition
is satisﬁed, namely, no ineﬃciency is found. On the other hand, in the one-period DL
model, the consumption of private goods is only half as much as that of the local public
goods under the subgame perfect equilibrium. The reason for this ineﬃciency is explained
as follows: The central government allocates subsidies to the region imposing a higher
local tax such that the private goods consumption in both the regions is identiﬁed. This
gives local governments an incentive to impose heavier taxes. That is, the subsidy policy
of the central government distorts the intratemporal resource allocation. We refer to the
distortion in a period that is induced by the central government’s actions in the same
period as basic SBC distortion.
5Two-Period DL Model Under the subgame perfect equilibrium, the intratemporal
resource allocation is ineﬃcient since the consumption of private goods is only half as
much as that of the local public goods in each period under the subgame perfect equilib-
rium. The reason for the intratemporal ineﬃciency is the same as that in the one-period
DL model, namely, basic SBC distortion.
The gross outstanding local bonds under the subgame perfect equilibrium are too
high as compared with the optimal solution. This implies overconsumption in the ﬁrst
period and underconsumption in the second period. The reason for the distortion of
the intertemporal resource allocation may be explained as follows: If a local government
expands its outstanding local bonds in the ﬁrst period, it raises the local taxes to redeem
the local bonds or to pay the interest in the second period. This increase in the local taxes
reduces the consumption of private goods. This reduction in private goods consumption is
the cost of expanding the outstanding local bonds. However, the cost is reduced because
the central government provides subsidies to the region where local taxes are high. In
this manner, the subsidy policy of the central government in the second period gives
the local governments an incentive to expand their outstanding local bonds in the ﬁrst
period. We refer to the distortion caused by the local governments’ expectation of central-
government-sponsored bailouts in the second period as price eﬀect distortion. The reason
for the distortion in the two-period DL model is the same as that in the inﬁnitely iterated
DL model examined in Takahashi, Takemoto, and Suzuki (2007).3
Two-Period CL Model Under the subgame perfect equilibrium, the intratemporal
resource allocation is eﬃcient in that the consumption of private goods equals that of the
local public goods in each period.
The gross outstanding local bonds under the subgame perfect equilibrium are too high
as compared with the optimal solution. This implies overconsumption in the ﬁrst period
and underconsumption in the second period. In this sense, the intertemporal resource
allocation is ineﬃcient under the subgame perfect equilibrium. Although no eﬃciency is
found in the one-period CL model, ineﬃciency is observed in the two-period CL model.
The reason for the distortion of the intertemporal resource allocation may be explained
as follows: In the second period, the central government allocates subsidies to the region
with higher outstanding local bonds such that the temporal utility in both the regions is
the same. This gives the local governments an incentive to issue more debt in the ﬁrst
period. That is, the subsidy policy of the central government distorts the intertemporal
resource allocation. We refer to the distortion that is induced by the central government’s
actions in the second period as dynamic SBC distortion.
The reason for the distortion in the two-period model is quite diﬀerent from that in
the inﬁnitely iterated CL model examined in Takahashi et al. (2007). In the inﬁnitely
iterated CL model, an intertemporal distortion occurs in the outcome of a certain Markov
perfect equilibrium (MPE), while an intratemporal distortion is not found. The distortion
is referred to as direct overcompetitive distortion in Takahashi et al. (2007).4
The dynamic SBC distortion in the two-period model is quite diﬀerent from the direct
overcompetitive distortion in the following respect. In the inﬁnitely iterated CL model,
the local governments’ strategies are not controllable by the central government’s strate-
3Two-period models are naturally extended to t-period models for an arbitrary time period t, and the
inﬁnitely iterated DL and CL models can be interpreted as the limit of the t-period DL and CL models
as t → ∞.
4We omit a disquisition for saving space.
6gies in the following sense: no matter how the central government varies its strategies,
each local government has no incentive to deviate its strategies in constructing the MPE.
In the inﬁnitely iterated CL model, each local government has no interest in the delivery
rule of the subsidies but is only concerned with the amount of the subsidies. On the other
hand, in the two-period CL model, the local governments’ strategies are controllable by
the central government’s strategies; in other words, the local governments change their
strategies depending on the central government’s strategy. In the two-period CL model,
each local government is interested in not only the amount of the subsidies but also the
delivery rule of the subsidies.
5.2 Social Welfare
V CL(B0) and V DL(B0) denote social welfares under the subgame perfect equilibrium
in the two-period CL and DL models, respectively, and are as follows.
V
CL(B0) = 2(1 + β)lnI(B0) + 2{β ln
β(1 + r)
2
− (1 + β)ln(2 + β)} − 2(1 + β)ln2,
V
DL(B0) = 2(1 + β)lnI(B0) + 2{β ln
2β(1 + r)
3
− (1 + β)ln(3 + 2β)} − (1 + β)ln2,
(∀β ∈ (0,1)) V
CL > V
DL,
where I(B0) = 2 + 2
1+r +
¯ b1+¯ b2
1+r − (1 + r)B0 and B0 = b1
0 + b2
0.
In the one-period CL model, the outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium is ef-
ﬁcient, namely, the social welfare is maximized, whereas the outcome of the subgame
perfect equilibrium in the one-period DL model is not.
On the other hand, social welfare in both the two-period CL and DL models, the social
welfare is not maximized. The result in the one- and two-period models are consistent in
that the CL model is more desirable than the DL model.
6. Conclusion
The results are summarized as follows:
• Ineﬃciency is observed in the two-period CL model, while it is not observed in the
one-period CL model.
• In the two-period CL model, there exists no intratemporal distortion. However, an
intertemporal distortion is observed in this model.
• An intertemporal distortion also occurs in the two-period DL model. The manner
of appearence diﬀers from that in the two-period CL model, although the reason
for this are subsidies from the central government in both the models.
• The social welfare in the two-period CL model is higher than that in the two-period
DL model.
Table 1 summarizes the distortion of resource allocation.
7Appendices
Since the outcome of one-period models is same as the one in period 2 in two-period
models, all appendices are devoted to describe the outcome of two-period models.
A. Solution of Planning Problem
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1) means the diﬀerence of before-subsidy income between
two regions. Therefore, the central government equalize after-subsidy income between


























1. We get (c1
1)∗ by solving the following problem;
max 4 lnc
1










I(B0) = 2 + 2
1+r +
¯ b1+¯ b2
1+r − (1 + r)B0 and B0 = b1
0 + b2
0 as deﬁned in Section 5.
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B. Solution of DL Model
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8In period 2, private goods consumption is
˜ c
1












and public goods consumption is
˜ g
1












Decision of local governments in period 2 is invariant by the subsidies from the central















The central government decides subsidies to help the resident more paying local tax. That
is, the central government equalizes private goods consumption between two regions.
The F.O.C. for qi
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and the F.O.C. for bi
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1) is a part of an equilibrium. In any equilibrium, private and local public
goods consumption is as follows:
2˜ c
1
1 = 2˜ c
2
1 = ˜ g
1






C. Solution of CL Model
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Equilibrium bonds of local government i in period 1 are
ˆ b
i
1 = −(1 + s
i






The local tax of local government i in period 1 is
ˆ q
i









Therefore, the central government takes any s1




















β(1 + r)ˆ c
i
1,
the outcome of the equilibrium in the two-period CL model is ineﬃcient. While there is
no distortion of resource allocation intratemporally, there are intertemporal distortions.
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Table 1: Comparison of Distortion
Model Intratemporal Distortion Intertemporal Distortion
One-Period CL Nonexistence —
One-Period DL Basic SBC Distortion —
Two-Period CL Nonexistence Dynamic SBC Distortion
Two-Period DL Basic SBC Distortion Price Eﬀect Distortion
11